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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

Bo:NXYE

V. HooPER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Civil No. 7887

GExERAL "JioTORS CoRPORATioN,

Defen&ant and Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bonnye V. Hooper, plaintiff and appellant herein,
and her son, Beverly H.ooper, purchased a new model
1951, Chevrolet pickup truck from the Hyland Motor
Company in Ely, Nevada, on July 21, 1951. The truck
was manufactured and assembled by General Motors
Corporation, defendant and respondent, herein, and was
sold by respondent to the Hyland Motor Company, one of
respondent's dealers (R. 254, 255 ).
The left rear wheel on the truck was defectively
manufactured. On October 15, 1951, while appellant
wa~ driving the truck, the defective wheel failed causing
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the truck to overturn and resulting in serious injuries
to appellant.
From a verdict and judgment in favor of General
Motors Corporation ~ppellant, Bonnye V. Hooper,
appeals.
POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT
1. The trial court's Instruction No. 6 was prejudicial error.
2. The trial court erred in admitting opinion evidence of Mr. Arthur Harris on the ultimate fact in issue.
3. The trial court erred in admitting the hearsay
testimony of Mr. Lowell G. Fouts.
4. The trial court erred in admitting the speculative testimony of Mr. Arthur Harris.
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE
The plaintiff and appellant is a resident of White
Pine County, Nevada. She and her son, Beverly U.
Hooper, as partners own and operate a cattle ranch in
Newark Valley, White Pine County, Nevada. (R. 120)
U.S. Highway No. 50 is a paved highway running
in an easterly and westerly direction between Eureka,
Nevada, and Ely, Nevada. The Newark Valley Highway is a gravelled road that runs in a northerly and ~
southerly direction and intersects U.S. Highway No.
50 on the north side thereof at a point approximately ~
14 miles east of Eureka, Nevada. At the intersection ~
of the two highways there is a club and bar known as
the El Dorado Club. The Hooper ranch is located 23
miles north of the intersection on the Newark Valley
Highway.
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On July :.:!1, 1951, appellant and her son purchased
a new model 1951 Chevrolet pickup truck from the
Hyland ~Iotor Company in Ely, Nevada. The truck
was purchased for ranch use. (R. 56, 57, 120) Hyland
:\lotor Company purchased the truck from General
:\Iotors Corporation, defendant and respondent, at wholesale and sold it to appellant and her son at retail. Respondent manufactured and assembled the truck. The
left rear wheel on said truck was manufactured by
the X orris Thern1ador Corporation and was assembled
and placed on the truck by respondent. (R. 254, 255)
On October 15, 1951, appellant left the ranch in the
truck at approximately 6:05 p.m. She was going to Eureka, XeYada, to attend a lodge meeting and to attend to
some ranch business (R. 121). Appellant was alone in
the truck (R. 121). Appellant was driving the truck at
about 30 miles per hour in a southerly direction on the
Xewark Valley Highway and, when she reached a point
approximately six or seven miles north of the said intersection, the left rear end of the truck suddenly dropped
down. The truck then swerved to the left; and, when
appellant tried to turn it back to the right, it tipped
over in such a manner that it went over the right front
fender, on over on top of the cab and down on its left
side. (R. 122) The truck skidded for several feet on
its left side. When it came to rest, it was lying on its
left side facing in a northv,~esterly direction on the
surface of the gravelled highway (R. 257, 260). The
left do of was sprung completely open. ( R. 123, 126, 127)
Appellant'~ right foot and leg were pinned between

~
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the upper rear portion of the cab of the truck and the
gravelled road The olitside of appellant's right foot and
leg were lying next to the cab and the inside of her
right foot and leg were lying on the gravelled road.
( R. 123, 124, 125)
The accident occurred between 6 :30 p.m. and 6:45
p.m. on October 15, 1951 (R. 126). Appellant lay pinned
under the truck from then until help arrived, which
was over an hour after the accident.
The first person to arrive at the scene was Mrs.
Jim Stinnett (R. 126}. She immediately went for help..
Jim Stinnett, Dan Milovich and two other men went to
the scene upon being notified of the accident by Mrs.
Stinnett. When they arrived at the scene of the accident, they lifted the truck onto its wheels, put appellant in Dan Milovich 's automobile and took her to the
El Dorado Club where an ambulance was called to take
her to Ely, Nevada. (R. 128, 129, 130)
As a result of the accident appellant received very
serious permanent injuries. Her right foot was about
two-thirds amputated. She suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the right tibia (shin bone) and
fibula. The right tibia and fibula were badly splintered
and serious damage to the right astragulus (foot bone)
and the right ankle joint was sustained. The left ankle
bone was fractured, a right upper tooth knocked out and
both legs were severely bruised. (R. 166 to 175, 243, 247,
248, 249)
Appellant was in the hospital from October 15, 1951,
until February 11, 1952.
·~
4
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It is the opinion of the doctors that Mrs. Hooper's
right leg "ill ultimately have to be amputated midway between the ankle and knee. Even if the right
leg is saved, and in the opinion of the doctors there
is only one in ten chances of saving it, the right leg
will be about an inch shorter than the left leg and the
ankle "ill be permanently stiff. Whether the right foot
is saved or amputated, nirs. Hooper will ·be limited
so far as engaging in her occupation as a rancher and
carrying on her ranch activities by about 75% for the
rest of her life. (R. 171 to 174, 247, 248, 249)
At the time of the accident the truck was less than
three months old. It had been driven approximately
6,700 miles (R. 82).
The left rear wheel of the truck consists of a
"spider" and a "rim." The spider is the center part
of the wheel that bolts to the hub or drum of the axle.
The rim is that part of the wheel on which the tire is
mounted. The rim is attached to the spider by rivets.
The spider; Exhibit "A", and the rim, Exhibit "B",
were found in a completely separated condition after
the accident. The spider, Exhibit "A", was still bolted
to the left rear hub of the truck. The tire, Exhibit "C ",
was flat and was still mounted on the rim, Exhibit "B ".
The rim had come loose from the spider, had completely
separated therefrom and was lying on the ground after
the accident. (R. 63, 64, 65, 66, 152, 153, 164, 165, 264,
265, 272)
Dan ~Iilovich, a witness for appellant, testified that
immediatPl~~ after the accident the spider, Exhibit ''A'',

5
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and the rim, Exhibit "B", were found in a completely
separated condition. (R. 152, 153, 164, 165) Mr. Jim
.Stinnett, a witness for respondent, testified that immediately after the accident the spider, Exhibit "A", and
the rim, Exhibit "B", were found in a completely
separated condition. (R. 264, 265, 272)
There was a 0onflict in the evidence as to whether
or not the left rear wheel of the truck was defective
and as to whether or not the defect caused the accident and injuries in question.
There are twelve rivet holes in the rim. For identification purposes, the valve stem hole in the rim is
placed up, and the rivet role immediately below the valve
stem hole is number 12. The rivet hole next to the
valve stem hole in a clockwise direction is number 1,
the next one number 2 and so on around to number 12.
An examination of the rim, Exhibit "B" immediately after the accident revealed that the rim on the
under side near rivet holes number 1, 2, 3 and 4 was
shiny and worn (R. 66, 67). Mr. David H. Curtis, expert
witness for appellant, testified that the sm·oothness and
wear had taken place over a considerable length of
time prior to failure of the wheel (R. 184, 185). He
testified that this wear showed there had been loose
rivets in holes numbered 1, 2 and 3 prior to failure
of the wheel and the resulting accident, and that this
looseness would have permitted movement between the
spider, Exhibit "A", and the rim, Exhibit "B'', and
also would have permitted vibration and oscillation
qetween the two component parts as the truck was
6
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being driven (R. 183 ) ..Mr. Curtis further testified that
three loose riYets in an otherwise normal wheel of the
type represented by Exhibits '"A" and "B" would
cause an ultin1ate failure of the entire wheel (R. 185,
186). He further testified that the reasons it would
cause such a failure are: 1. that loos.eness of three
rivets would cause a shifting of the load to the other
rivets which could result in an ultimate failure of the
wheel, and :2. that looseness in the rivets would cause
a vibration or oscillation which could cause the other
rivets to fatigue and fail ( R. 185, 186).
~Ir. Arthur Harris, an employee of and an expert
witness for respondent, testified that in his opinion
the separation of the spider and rim as represented
by Exhibits "A" and "B" was caused by an extremely
heavy blow being struck on the outer rim which caused
the spider to distort and then shear the rivets (R.
362, 363).
ARGU~IENT

PorNT

1.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

The trial court instructed the jury as f.ollows :
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (R. 36)
(Same instruction as respondent's requested instruction
No. 3, R. 19).

"You are instructed that the fact that the rim
and spider were found in a separated condition
after the accident is no evidence of the fact that

7
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they were defective, unsound or unsafe when
assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors
Corporation, nor is it evidence of the fact that
the separating of the rim and spider caused the
truck to go out of control and over turn."
The effect of this instruction is to remove completely
from the consideration of the jury, the evidence that the
spider, Exhibit "A", and the rim, Exhibit "B", were
found cmnpletely separated after the accident. The instruction is a declaration by the trial eourt, that as a
matter of law, the jury must not consider the fact of
such separation on the issue of defective manufacture
and on the issue of causation.
To point up the vice of this instruction we must
look briefly at the evidence on the issue of defective
manufacture and on the issue of whether the separation
of the spider and rim caused the truck to overturn
which resulted in appellant's injuries.
Appellant's evidence on these two issues was:
1. The fact that the spider, Exhibit" A" and
the rim, Exhibit '' B' ', were found in a completely
separated condition after the accident (R. 63, 64,
65, 66, 152, 153, 164, 165, 264, 265, 272).

2. That worn shiny spots appeared on the
rim, Exhibit "B ", on the under side of rivet
holes numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 (R. 66, 67, 184, 185).
3. Expert testimony to the effect that the
smoothness and wear had taken place over a considerable length of time prior to the ultimate
failure of the wheel; that such wear showed there
had been loose rivets in holes numbered 1, 2
and 3 prior to failure of the wheel and the result8
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ing accident; that this looseness would have pernutted movement between the spider, Exhibit
""A", and the rim, Exhibit "B", and would also
have permitted vibration and oscillation between
the two component parts; that three such loose
riYets would cause an ultimate failure of the wheel
( R. 184, 185, 186).
4. The truck was less than three months old
and had been driven only 6, 700 miles ( R. 56, 57,
82).

5. That there had been no prior damage to
the left rear wheel of the truck (See Exhibit
"S ", R. 42, 67, 81, 82 to 86, 91, 92, 113, 239, 240,
241).
'

6. That the first indication that anything was
wrong just prior to the accident was that the
left rear end of the truck suddenly dropped down.
The truck then swerved to the left and, when
turned back to the right, it tipped over (R. 122,
123).
7. That an automobile 'track at the scene of
the accident swerved to the left out onto the
shoulder of the road and back slightly to the
right (R. 79, 80, 151, 152, 177, 178, Exhibit "7").
Respondent's evidence was in conflict with that of
appellant's and attempted to show that the wheel was
not defective and that the separation of the spider and
rim was caused by a heavy blow being struck on the rim
(R. 362, 363).
1. DEFECTIVE MANUFACTURE.
Instruction No. 6, i11 effect, told the jury, that it
eould not consider, and that it must disregard completely,

9
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the fact that the rim and the spider separated and were
found in that condition after the accident (R. 36).
The fact that the rim and spider were found in a
separated condition after the accident was relevant on
the issue ·of defective manufacture. The fact of such
separation, when considered with all the other circumstances, tended to prove that the wheel was defectively
manufactured. The other evidence and circumstances to
be considered with the fact of the separation were:
worn spots under three rivet holes from which it could
be inferred there were three loose rivets in the wheel,
the expert's opinion that that wear had taken place
over a considerable length of time, that three loose rivets
would cause an ultimate failure of the wheel, that the
first indication of anything being wrong was the dropping of the left rear end, the swerving of the truck to the
left, the attempt to turn it to the right and its tipping
over, that an automobile track at the scene swerved to
the left out onto the shoulder of the road and back to
the right, that the truck was practically new and had
not been previ·ously damaged. All of this evidence and
the circumstances surrounding the accident when considered with the fact of the separation of the spider
and rim have probative value and tend to prove that
the wheel was faulty, and the jury was entitled to consider the fact of separation in its determination of the
ultimate issue of whether or not the wheel was defective.
This is not a case involving the rule announced in
Morrisson v. Perry, 104 Utah 139, 122 P(2) 191, to the
effect that the mere happening of an automobile colli10
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sion gives rise to no presumption of negligence. This,
on the contrary, is a singling out, by the trial court, of
a vital part of appellant's evidence and a direction, as
a matter of law, that it may not be considered by the
jury in determining whether or not there was a defect
in the wheel. The instruction amounts to not only a
comment on the evidence but a direction to the jurors
that they will decide the case as though the fact of
the separation of the spider and rim were not in evidence and not before them at all.
To withdraw from the jury's consideration the fact
of the separation of the spider and rim was to withdraw
a vital and substantial link from the chain of circumstances, all of which, when considered together, proved
that the wheel \Yas defectively manufactured.

2. CAUSATION.
The instruction not only removes the fact of separation of the rim and spider from the case on the iss1,1e
of defective manufacture, but it also declares that the
fact of such separation may not be considered by the
jury on the question of whether it caused the truck to
go out of control and over turn.
If the fact of the separation is taken out of the
case, what do we have left on the issue of causation~
That can best be illustrated by assuming that, instead
of separating, the spider and rim remained intact and
were found in an apparently sound condition after the
accident. If the spider and rim had been found in an
. apparently normal condition after the accident, could
11
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appellant have ever claimed the over turning of the
truck was caused by the failure of the wheel~ The
answer is obvious, no such claim could possibly have
been made.
Certainly the fact of the separation of the spider
and rim was relevant on the issue of what caused the
truck to over turn. Appellant testified that she was
driving down a gravel r,oad at a normal rate of speed,
and the first indication of an impending accident was
that she felt the left rear end suddenly drop down, the
truck swerve to the left, and when she tried to turn it
back to the right, it tipped over (R. 122, 123, 127).
After the accident the rim and spider were found in
a separated condition (R. 63, 64, 65, 66, 152, 153, 164,
165, 264, 265, 272). Take the fact of such separation
from the jury, (as instruction No. 6 does) and a sub'stantial part of appellant's evidence as to what caused
the truck to tip over has been thrown out and excluded
from the consideration of the jury.
That the evidence as to the separated condition of
the rim, Exhibit "B", and the spider, Exhibit "A",
was relevant and admissible see Kelly v. Huber Baking
Co., 145 Md. 321, 125 A. 782, (evidence of condition of
steering gear after accident held relevant and properly
admitted); Curtin v. Benjamin, 305 Mass. 489, 26
N.E. (2) 354, 129 A.L.R. 433, (condition of left front tire
after accident held admissible to show point of impact);
Hwpp Motor Company v. Wadsworth, 113 F(2) 827,
(evidence that pitman arm was completely disconnected
fr;om the ball stud after accident and other evidence as

12
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to wear on, and condition of, steering mechanism after
accident was held substantial evidence that accident
occurred by reason of defective steering mechanism);
Rotche v. BHick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 5:27, 193 N.E. 529,
(necessary implication of decision is that had proper
foundation been laid as to condition of cotter pins in
brake mechanism observed two weeks after accident,
it would have been relevant and admissible on issue of
defective manufacture and causation); Staples v. Spence,
179 Ya. 359, 19 S.E. (2) 69, (photographs of automobiles
immediately after accident admitted, but oral testimony
as to condition of automobiles after accident excluded;
held, error); Evansville Container Corporation v. McDonald, 132 F(2) 80, (condition of automobiles after
accident admissible as means of determining fault) ;
129 A.L.R. 438, (general rule that evidence as to condition of an automobile subsequent to an accident is
admissible as a means of ascertaining the responsibility
for the accident, where the evidence is not too remote
from the time of the accident, and where it is shown that
the condition of the automobile has not changed since
the accident); Dixon v. ~wood, 81 N.H. 385, 125 A. 261,
(condition of automobile after accident relevant on issue
as to hmY accident occurred); General AI otors Corporation v. Johnson, 137 F(2) 320, evidence of condition of
axle housing and transmission housing after accident,
and evidence of wear on such parts that appeared after
accident was held relevant and held sub:.;tantial evidence that accident occurred by reason of faulty con~truction of truck) ; 65 C.J .S. Sec. 231, page 1046: 20

13
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Am. Jur. Sec. 272, page 260.
We submit that the trial court, by withdrawing
from the jury's consideration the fact of the separation
of the spider and rim, committed prejudicial error.

2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
OPINION EVIDENCE OF. MR. ARTHUR HARRIS
ON THE ULTIMATE FACT IN ISSUE.
The trial court, over objection, permitted Mr. Arthur
Harris to testify as to his conclusion on the ultimate fact
in issue. In response to a question, * * *
POINT

Q. "Do you have an opinion, Mr. Harris, as
to what occurred to cause the separation of the
spider and rim as represented by Exhibits "A"
and "B"~"
The trial court over objection permitted Mr. Harris
to testify that in his opinion, "that the wheel was struck
an extremely heavy blow by some object on the outer
rim which first * * * caused the spider to distort and
then shear off the rivets." (R. 362, 363)
DeGroot v. Winters et al., 261 Mich. 660, 249 N.W.
69, was a malpractice suit. A doctor for the plaintiff
was permitted to testify that malpractice "did" produce the condition suffered by plaintiff. On appeal the
Supreme Court held that on the ultimate issue of whether
plaintiff's condition was or was not occasioned by malpractice, expert opinion testimony that malpractice
"did" rather than "could" occasion the result was incompetent because it invaded the province of the jury.
The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed.
14
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In the case of Layton v. Cregan~ Mallory Co. Inc.,
265 Mich. 574, 25:2 N.W. 337, the court permitted a medical witness to answer the following question: ''Is the
condition you found during all this time, in your opinion,
caused by the injury she sustained in the accident, or
by working on the farm~'' The court in reversing the
judgment for the plaintiff held that this testimony invaded the province of the jury, and its admission, over
objection, constituted error. For a case to the same
effect see Kenower v. Hotels, Statley Co., 124 F(2) at
page 663. For a case not in point but announcing the
general rule that an expert witness may not express his
opinion on the ultimate fact in issue see Utah Copper Co.
vs. Industrial Commission, 69 Utah 452, 256 P. 399.
The rationale of the cases cited are to the effect
·that an expert witness may express an opinion as to
what "could" or "might" have caused a particular condition, but he cannot be permitted to express an opinion
that an alleged cause "was" the cause of or "did" cause
the particular condition. Whether a certain cause did
in fact produce a given condition is for the jury to
decide and is not a matter upon which an expert may
express an opinion.· See the excellent discussion of this
problem in DeGroot v. Winters, supra, and the cases
cited therein.
In the case before this court, Mr. Arthur Harris,
over objection, was permitted to testify that in his
opinion the separation of the spider, Exhibit "A", and
the rim, Exhibit "B ", "was" caused by an extremely
heav~' blow striking the outer rim. He did not testify

15
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that such a blow "could" have caused or "might" have
caused the separation. Mr. Harris was asked for and
expressed his opinion as to the ,cause of the separation
of the specific wheel involved in this litigation. The question was not hypothetical in form and was improper
for that reason.
We submit that admitting this testimony, over objection, was prejudicial error.
POINT

3.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF MR. LOWELL G.
FOUTS.
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or
not there was a track at the scene of the accident that
went off the surface of the road on the east side thereof
and over the edge of the shoulder. Mr. Stinnett testified
there was (R. 257 to 260, 267 to 272). Mr. Milovich and
Beverly Hooper testified they did not see one (R. 163,
164, 107, 108, 109, 110). Appellant testified the truck
never left the road ( R. 122, 127).
Lowell G. Fouts, over objection, was permitted to
testify, in substance, that Mr. Stinnett told him there was
a track or mark that ran off the road and that Mr.
Stinnett had shown him such a mark sometime aft~r
the accident. Mr. Fouts further testified that he went
to the scene of the accident in May, 1952, several months
after the accident with Franklin Harris and the same
mark was still evident (R. 400, 401, 402, 403).
The only purpose for offering and admitting this
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testin10ny was for the truth of the fact asserted by
:Jir. Stinnett, na1nely, that such a 1nark going off the
road in fact existed.
\Ye submit the testimony was hearsay and the court
erred in admitting it, and in refusing to strike it on
motion of the appellant.
POINT

4.

THE TRI~\L COURT ERRED IN ADI\liTTING
THE 8PECULATIVE TESTIMONY OF
~IR. ARTHUR H.._\RRIS.
The trial court, over objection that the testimony
was speculative, permitted _Mr. Arthur Harris to testify
that if the left rear wheel of the truck struck a boulder
of any size or type as shown in Exhibit '' 1 '' and there
was some side motion to the truck that that would be
enough force t~ cause the shearing of the rivets and
the separation of the spider, Exhibit "A", and the rim,
Exhibit •'B ", provided the boulder was partially buried
so that there would be resistance to its sliding (R.
393, 394).
There "·as no assumption made at all as to the speed
of the truck at the time of hitting such a boulder. There
was no evidence in the record at all that any boulders
of any size were partially buried. There was no evidence
that there were any boulders either burie(l or otherwise
in or near the track which Mr. Stinnett said went
off the road.
The testimony was admitted, over objection, and
the trial court refused, on motion of appellant, to strike
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.,

it from the record. Mr. Harris was permitted to speculate and give his conjectural views on a vital issue in
the case, namely, what ,caused the accident. We submit
the admission of the testimony and the refusal to
grant appellant's motion to strike was prejudicial error.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HANNI and
E. R. MILLER, JR.,
Attorneys for Appellwnt.
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